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	Yaguine Koita and Fodé Tourikara​[1]​


In preparation for this conference I have looked back at my own work and the work of others in the period just after most of Sub-Saharan Africa achieved independence. My own place was in the University of Zambia, from 1967 to 1971. Perusing our publications of the late sixties and early seventies of this quickly passing century, what strikes me is first of all our belief in the new politics as a basis for development. Not without reason colonialism had been regarded as the basic constraint to improvement of people's living conditions and to political integration.​[2]​ In most African countries those fighting for freedom had overcome. The independent African state not merely signified political liberty, it would also constitute the primary instrument towards the uplifting of its own people.​[3]​ A remaining constraint was of course white minority power in much of Southern Africa but liberation was certain. "One day", my colleague Richard Sklar exclaimed, "African nations will negotiate from strength."​[4]​ 

Sklar wrote this in a book on Politics in Zambia which appeared in 1974: after the transition to "the Second Republic" with its "one-party system of democracy". In that publication we do find concern with the quality of Zambian politics but, remarkably, not with the character of the state and the quality of government in post-independence Zambia. Yes, we had read René Dumont's L'Afrique noire est mal partie​[5]​ with its attack on the African "elites" who had just continued their colonial predecessors' attempts at surplus extraction from the rural masses. We did review the barter terms of trade between people in rural and urban areas, showing that peasants had to produce twice as much maize to afford a shirt or a pair of trousers than before independence, and we did criticize Zambia's excessive spending on a huge copper-decorated Conference Hall, constructed especially for the Non-aligned summit of 1970. But we did not look at the exercise of political authority nor did we examine the quality of government as such. My own book on Zambia's economic reforms entitled After Mulungushi. The Economics of Zambian Humanism​[6]​ describes and explains, among other things, why the Zambian government had to take a majority interest in a number of  "key enterprises" but nowhere it examines the capacities of the state as an intended instrument of development. In the non-competitive markets of a former colony, private enterprise was seen as a source of exploitation and the state as the protector of its people; it was as simple as that. The statist approach to development that was generally adopted was based on a general belief in the illegitimacy of private profit-making, shared by intellectuals and policy-makers alike​[7]​, combined with a failure to look behind the outward appearance of the state. In Charles Elliott's Constraints of the economic development of Zambia (1971)​[8]​, to just mention one more publication to which I personally contributed, there is nothing on government and the capacities of the state. Faced by constraints in the international economic order and in the national economic structure, the primary challenge in our eyes was to find the right economic policies.

Ten years later publications began to appear on matters such as Corruption and Inefficiency in Zambia.​[9]​ A rapidly growing attention was paid to the terms of the political order and the ways in which political authority is exercised. A new terminology emerged with words such as "the failed state", "the collapsed state", "a rent-seeking society", "the facade of the African state", "the role of kleptocratic elites", "pocketalism", "the patrimonial state", "the predatory national state". My former colleague Sklar, too, now went beyond the abstraction of "African Nations", pointing at the control of dominant institutions in society by "ostensibly privileged power holders and their immediate families".​[10]​ "African exceptionalism", as it has been aptly termed​[11]​, had come to an end. What this implies is that African political discourse inherent in, for example, African socialism, Zambian humanism and Negritude, was no longer regarded as an acceptable basis for models of government that would make Africa exempt from democratic principles such as accountability, transparency, and substitutability of persons holding office. 

Illustrative for the shift in focus is the way in which industrialisation through import substitution is looked at as a strategy for development. While in the sixties and seventies the emphasis was primarily on diversification in economic "mono-cultures" and the need for protection through import restriction in the "infant industry" stage, the literature of the eighties and nineties focuses on "the competition for licenses and the governmental positions that dispend them."​[12]​ Indeed, two decades later the language of development in Africa appears to have changed completely. Good government and "governance" had become "almost an obsession" in the development debate.​[13]​

The background of this new focus on Governance lies in dysfunctioning market economies in connection with failed economic policies. In the mid-eighties the failure of development engineering based on an instrumentalist view of the state and its law- and policy-making capacities had been clearly noted. The emphasis shifted from state-led development to a revived belief in the market. In 1986 a Conference was held in Nairobi on "the Enabling Environment for Private Sector Contributions to Development".​[14]​ This was held to imply primarily a shrinking public sector so as to create space for the market economy. The general failure of the post-independence para-statals was acknowledged with ensuing public sector reforms including outright privatization. In order to acquire desperately needed foreign exchange African governments had to accept "structural adjustment programmes" that encompassed such public sector reforms as well as a severe cutting in subsidies, including those on basic food stuffs. These  were meant to dismantle the old system of government controls. This consisted of not only a huge parastatal sector but also high protective barriers, state-operated credit schemes, price and incomes control, exchange control (with the accompanying black markets in foreign currency), and a system of state-set producer prices for agricultural commodities.

However, "an enabling environment" was also interpreted as a government that would provide the necessary supporting services. In its 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth the World Bank specified the role of the state in an enabling environment as follows:

	The State has an indispensable role in creating a favourable economic environment. This should, in fact, be its primary concern. It is of the utmost importance for the State to establish a predictable and honest administration of the regulatory framework, to assure law and order, and to foster a stable, objective, and transparent judicial system. In addition it should provide reliable and efficient infrastructure and social and information services, whether private or state-owned."​[15]​

In its summit on Social Development in Copenhagen (1995) the United Nations reemphasized the need for creating enabling environments for development. Recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has linked the term to human rights. In this connection, it implies that rather than waiting for concrete violations to be addressed, actors in the field of human rights should enhance an environment within which people are able to exercise their rights under the law. In terms of policy UNDP has identified some "entry points" for its enabling environments approach. These include promotion of democratization and the institutions of good governance.​[16]​

The conventional meaning of environment is the circle of people around us. In the context of good governance it refers to the institutional setting within which power is exercised. Particularly relevant in this connection are the economy, the polity, society and culture. For institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund it is the economy that comes first. Good governance is primarily effective governance in the sense of an exercise of political authority conducive to the execution of economic policies held to be essential for a smooth functioning of the market economy. Actually, in its policy implications the notion of good governance came into operation when it appeared that economic objectives could not be attained through economic reforms alone. In its policy documents the World Bank later expanded its view of good governance to include democratic principles, and a strong civil society while even showing an open eye to the necessity of rooting African government in Africa's own cultural traditions, beliefs and the structure of its component societies.​[17]​

Naturally, there is nothing against a government able to execute its own policies including the collection of taxes, nor against transparency, accountability and responsive governance in the sense of government responding to the needs and demands of civil society.​[18]​ On the contrary, from the African peoples' own perspective there is every reason to applaud the end of African exceptionalism. Yet, there are two interrelated aspects to the governance debate that demand an urgent shift in attention on the part of all actors and their actions. The first one concerns context, the second content. 

The context of good governance is, as we have seen, the creation of enabling environments. "Enabling whom?", one is inclined to ask. The answer lies in the background to the whole debate: Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, as it is expressed in the title of the World Bank report of 1989 that launched the notion. The actors whose environment should be "enabling" are all those involved in the modern economy tuned to growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita. Government must provide "rules to make markets work, and ensure property rights", it is stated in the 1992 World Bank report on Governance and Development.

Looking now at the contemporary African setting, what we see is a huge majority of people excluded from this environment. More than 60% live in situations of abject poverty, lacking any access whatsoever to the modern sector of their economies.​[19]​ They are either subsistence farmers or unemployed workers in the shanty towns of the cities. Even in South Africa 70% of the inhabitants of the townships are jobless. But, it might be asked, would not these benefit from an improvement of the environment of the modern market economy? In response to a similar question Engelhard has recently pointed to three important considerations.​[20]​ Firstly, there are no indications that conventional economic growth in the African context reduces poverty. In Mali, for example, a 6% GDP growth rate since 1995 has been accompanied by a 28% increase of the number of people living below the poverty line. Secondly, a focus on the modern export-oriented sector will affect only very few actors. In fact, none of the sixteen African success stories in income-generation mentioned by the French Development Agency is in the realm of the world market. Thirdly, even if a focus on the modern sector resulted in a 5% growth rate, it would still take one quarter of a century for the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa to attain an average income per head at the level of Tunisia today. 

Actually, the environment of those living in the outlying rural areas and the squatter compounds of the cities is far from "enabling". Millions of Africans live in adverse environments: misallocation of resources, extreme socio-economic inequality and exclusion, violence in and among communities, corruption, cultures of domination and submissiveness. This is the usual setting of abject poverty, famine and other gross and systematic violations of basic human dignity. In such conditions good governance is a term so far removed from the realities of the day that it has lost all meaning. Access to clean water, education, health services, food of sufficiently nutritious value, that is the question.

A primary adverse or "disabling" factor (as opposed to the qualification "enabling" in "enabling environments") is, indeed, a malfunctioning economy. This has, however, two aspects: economic ineffectiveness in the sense of misallocation of resources and economic injustice meaning exclusion of people from access to resources and entitlements to basic goods and services. The second question, then, is "What is the content (meaning) of development as a goal that should be enabled by an environment of good governance?" A review of conventional development oriented approaches to poverty and destitution​[21]​, based purely on increasing productivity as they are, reveals that responses merely focusing on market freedom tend to be insufficient at the least and sometimes even counterproductive. What is needed, then, is a view on development based on economic justice. This requires a proper analysis of existing entitlement systems -defined here as regularised arrangements in which people's participation in the economy is rooted- and their functioning. What structures are behind the little the poor can get from day to day and what blocks them in efforts to improve their livelihood? How to explain the apparent entitlement failures behind abject poverty? Clearly, if resource constraints are to be tackled through attempts to increase productivity these will have to be supplemented by entitlement oriented approaches. For one thing, such entitlement analyses are likely to point to the necessity of supporting credit schemes for the hundreds of thousands of micro-enterprises in Africa, rather than merely focusing on the operations of a modern banking system.

In this connection, it should be noted that the African masses are primarily dependent on the functioning of rural subsistence economies and urban informal economies. The role of law here is, first of all, customary law in an agricultural setting and living law in the context of an urban informal economy. This implies a focus on actual rather than just formal control of power albeit with an open eye to legitimacy in processes of executing power. In countries in which there is no meaningful labour law, for example, workers may still exert a significant influence upon working conditions.​[22]​ Living law is not state-law. Noteworthy in connection with the still growing attention to failed and collapsed states is a certain improvement in the living conditions in Somalia in a situation of almost complete ungovernment.​[23]​ 

Another important distinction in regard to the content of development is between primary and subsidiary entitlement systems. Subsidiary titles to claim goods and services materialise only after failure to acquire on the basis of rights that guarantee immediate access. An example is social welfare to support people who fail to get earnings from labour; another illustration is food aid in case of famine. Naturally, people tend to prefer primary entitlement in the sense of having access to resources and rights to goods and services on the basis of their integration into the community rather than subsidiary entitlement as compensation for their marginalisation. Illustrative is a shift in government thinking about poverty in South Africa: "Previously the emphasis was on redistribution of incomes... closing the gap. Now the focus is on more jobs".​[24]​ Such shifts in approach reflect a growing attention to people as subjects of rights rather than charity. 

In order to be meaningful in a development context, good governance, then, is to be related to the living conditions of the poor masses. Consequently, this notion should be lifted out of a narrow Weberian bureaucracy perspective and connected with people's daily struggles for livelihood. Illustrative in this connection is my own experience with one of the weekly "Donors on governance, democracy and human rights" meetings that are held in the office of the deputy permanent representative of UNDP in Lilongwe (Malawi) each Monday morning. On the day I attended this session a survey was presented which the Carter Centre for Democracy had carried out in Mwanza district, a truly outlying rural area. Focus group discussions had revealed that these people did not have any nostalgia to the authoritarian rule of dictator Banda, although their mistrust in politicians was revealed by the request that any development assistance should reach them through their chief and headmen rather than government ministers or MPs. Asked if they had anything to say on their own behalf they expressed a major worry with the tremendous rise in the cost of living since Banda had been removed from office and replaced by a democratically elected president. Apparently, the meeting saw no way to react to this confrontation with "the economic prerequisite of democracy" (Dan Usher). Upon hearing the report from Mwanza district it simply proceeded to the next item on its agenda: the introduction of television in that country, something which Banda had always prohibited. Obviously, there is very little connection between the agenda of the donors on good governance and the daily anxieties of the poor masses. Of course corrupt government does affect the lives of the poor but their first concern remains with the purchasing power of the little money they can obtain by selling fish or a few bags of maize. Indeed, GG (good governance) cannot be separated from PPP (the purchasing power of the poor). If good governance is to mean anything to the poor, it should have a meaning in terms of economic, social and cultural rights.​[25]​

Finally, I should like to come back to our neglect of the issues of good governance in the pioneering period of the sixties and seventies. It is true that many mistakes were made as a result of our blindness to the actual use of political authority and the terms of the political order. But the present obsession with good governance conceals the persistence of constraints to a development beneficial to the masses that we then did notice in those pioneering days: a world economy in which Africa suffers from unequal terms of trade, a dual local economy with continuous marginalization of the subsistence sector and a painful daily manifestation of economic injustice inherited from colonialism. Certainly, these preoccupations have not got out of date. Good governance is one thing, it is not the one big thing. Trying to explain the seemingly permanent African crisis, for example, the quality of African government is certainly not the only phenomenon that strikes the eye. Other major explanations lie in the false start of Western colonialism​[26]​, exogeneous factors such as adverse developments in world commodity prices​[27]​, and the disastrous "development cooperation" policies of foreign donors. 
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